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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 43

ARTICLE 63 -INJUNCTION

CPLR 6312:

Preliminary injunction may be granted despite
lack of a pleading.

Section 211 of the Domestic Relations Law forbids the service
of a complaint in divorce actions for 120 days from the service
of a summons or until the expiration of conciliation proceedings.
20
In Aqualina v. Aqualina,
plaintiff-wife served a summons seeking divorce and a complaint seeking an accounting and praying
that a trust be impressed on certain bank accounts. The court
dismissed the complaint on the basis of section 21 1,209 but granted
injunctive relief reasoning that no pleading was required to justify
a preliminary injunction in the circumstances disclosed.
To obtain a preliminary injunction a plaintiff must establish
two elements: first, he must establish a prima facie cause
of action; second, he must establish that there are grounds for
the issuance of an injunction.21 0
Aqualina stands for the
proposition that where the two elements are established, a preliminary injunction can be granted despite the lack of a complaint.
ARTICLE

75 - ARBITRATION

CPLR 7502; 7503: First application to court arising out of
arbitrable controversy must be served in accordance with
CPLR 7503.
2
Under CPLR 750 (a), a "special proceeding shall be used
to bring before a court the first application arising out of an
arbitrable controversy which is not made by motion in a pending
action."
Thus, the general procedure of Article 4 governing
all special proceedings is applicable. Under CPLR 7503(c), after
a notice of intention to arbitrate is served, the party served has
10 days to make an application to stay arbitration. "Notice of
such application shall be served in the same manner as a summons
or by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.12'1

20856 Misc. 2d 357, 288 N.Y.S.2d 671 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1968).
2 09
It was the opinion of the court that DRL §211 forbids the service
of any complaint with the summons in an action for divorce. For a general
discussion of New York's "cooling-off" statute see The Qutarterly Survey of
New York Practice, 42 ST. JOHN's L. RLv. 615, 634 (1968).
2107 WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, NEw YORK CML PRAMCEca
6312.02;
12 CARmODY-WAIT 2d, CYCLOPEDIA oF NEw YoIc PRAcrIcE §78:62 (1966).
211The inclusion of service by registered mail was suggested by the
bar associations, as it was the prevalent practice. SixTH REP. 647.
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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

In a recent case, Matter of Bauer,212 the petitioners served
MVAIC with a notice of intention to arbitrate. Within 10 days
thereafter, MVAIC served notice that it would apply for an order
staying the arbitration. This notice was served on the petitioner's
attorney. The court found that such service was null. Since
the application to stay the arbitration was the first application to
a court arising out of this arbitrable controversy, it had to be
served in accordance with CPLR 403 or CPLR 7503. In other
words, since it was not merely a motion, but rather the commencement of a special proceeding, service had to be made in the
same manner as a summons or by registered mail or certified mail,
return receipt requested.
CPLR 7511: Arbitrator's award difficult to set aside.
Generally, an arbitrator's award is not reversible by a court for
errors of law or fact.2 13 CPLR 7511(b) provides grounds for
vacating an award where a party's rights have been prejudiced by
(1) corruption, fraud or misconduct, (2) partiality of an arbitrator appointed as neutral, or (3) where an arbitrator exceeded his
powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a final and definite
award was not made.
In Granite Worsted Mills, Inc. v. Aaronson Cowen, Ltd.,21 4 the
appellate division, first department, reversed an order vacating and
setting aside an arbitration award to a buyer of defective goods.
The amount of the award was in excess of four times the purchase
price of the goods shipped, notwithstanding that the contract purported to limit the amount of the buyer's damages to the difference
in value between the goods specified and the goods actually delivered. The court, in determining whether the arbitrator exceeded
25
his power under 7511(b), first examined the arbitration clause, 1
finding it to be a broad arbitration clause. The court then examined the clause which purported to limit damages and decided that
it would not be irrational for the arbitrator to find this clause un-

55 Misc. 2d 991, 287 N.Y.S.2d 206 (Sup. Ct Wyoming County 1968).
E.g., In re Wilkins, 169 N.Y. 494, 62 N.E. 575 (1902); In re Colletti,
23 App. Div. 2d 245, 248, 260 N.Y.S.2d 130, 133 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d
460, 213 N.E.2d 894, 266 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1965).
21429 App. Div. 2d 303, 287 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1st Dep't 1968).
2
15 "ARBITRATION.
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract shall be settled by arbitration." Id. at 305, 287 N.Y.S.
2d at 767. This is a broad arbitration clause. In New York, where there is
a broad arbitration clause, the rules of law which apply are those that the
arbitrator deems appropriate. It re Exercycle Corp., 9 N.Y.2d 329, 334, 174
N.F_.2d 463, 464, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353, 355 (1961).
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